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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE 1993 AMENDMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNIZED
EMERGENCY RESPONSE VEHICLES FROM TORT LIABILITY WHEN
RESPONDING TO AN ORDINARY AUTO ACCIDENT

A.

"Open Courts" Provision - Utah Constitution, Art. I, Section 11:
JL

Berry Analysis

Despite the recent changes in the composition of this Court, the analysis of Berry v. Beech
Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) analysis was re-affirmed in Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch.
Dist. ,116 P.3d 295; 2005 UT 30. There, the School District failed to carry the "substantial burden"
of convincing the Court that "the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent",
Tindlley, ^[15, quoting Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79 at ^|45,57 P.3d 1007. The proper analysis
is under Berry, Wasatch County has failed to carry its burden under Berry to set forth why stare
decisis should not be followed.
2.

Clegg Had A Remedy Against Jensen, Individually

The first step of the Berry analysis is to determine whether Clegg was denied a remedy that
he had when the governmental immunity statute was passed. Wasatch County claims "[tjhere is no
basis for an argument that Clegg has been denied a remedy". (Appellee's Brief, p. 27). However,
Wasatch County identifies no remedy that Clegg has for his injuries. The fact that Clegg was turned
1

out of court without so much as a trial on immunity grounds seems like the ultimate lack of remedy.
The next question is whether Clegg had a "right" to a remedy against Jensen.] Prior decisions
of this Court show that Clegg had a remedy against Jensen prior to the passage of the statutory
governmental immunity provisions, beginning in 1965. Day v. State recognized a statutory duty of
care toward other drivers on the part of emergency vehicle operators while engaging in high speed
pursuit. This statutory duty is traced from 1931, through the 1993 amendments. Day, fn. 4. Day held
that this statute "clearly established a duty of reasonable care on the part of operators of emergency
vehicles to those sharing the use of a road with emergency vehicles". Id. In accordance with this
generalized statement of the duty created, there is no reason why that duty would not apply to high
speed emergency response as opposed to high speed pursuit. The duty to drive with reasonable care
applies whether an emergency responder is driving in pursuit of a criminal or to the scene of an
automobile accident.
This duty was again recognized in Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616; 2000 UT 19. While Day
specifically imposed a duty of reasonable care on drivers of emergency vehicles in "pursuit", Lyon
found the same duty of reasonable care on drivers of emergency vehicles in "response". Day
involved a police pursuit of a fleeing criminal, while Lyon involved a fire chief driving to an
emergency fire. Both cases essentially state the same holding, in the two kinds of emergency vehicle
liability: pursuit and response.

1

Wasatch County falls within the Standifordtest for governmental functions. See Lyon v.
Burton, at f 14, holding that driving an emergency vehicle to the scene of a fire is a
"governmental function".
2

Lyon extensively examined the historical roots of liability for government employees in their
individual capacity. Lyon found that historically, a person driving an emergency vehicle would be
acting in a "ministerial" or "operational" capacity. Id., at 629-630; ^[45-49.
Under these long-established principles, Chief Burton would be personally liable to
plaintiffs for his negligent driving. Jensen, 2 Utah 2d 196,271 P.2d 838, is squarely
on point. Jensen suggests that the operation of an emergency vehicle such as a fire
engine does not involve the exercise of governmental discretion. On facts much like
the instant case, Jensen held the driver of a city fire engine personally liable for
negligently causing injuries to a passenger in a car hit by the fire engine, even though
the city was immune from suit. Cornwall, 571 P.2d 925, held to the same effect with
respect to a deputy sheriffs negligent driving while responding to an emergency
situation.[citations omitted].
Id. At f48.
Wasatch County has failed to explain why Jensen would be acting in a "ministerial" or
"operational" capacity while responding to a fire, as in Lyon, but not to an automobile accident. No
logical distinction seems apparent. The trial court erred in failing to recognize that Jensen would
have been personally liable for negligent driving at common law, before the Governmental Immunity
Act was passed in 1965 and 1987.
X

Clegg Has No Substitute Remedy Against Wasatch County.

Wasatch County argues that the 1993 Legislative amendments removed any duty Jensen
might have previously owed to Clegg. The next question is whether Clegg was provided a substitute
remedy. Three members of this Court agreed in Lyon that the substituted cause of action against the
Fire District, while capped at $250,000.00, was an adequate substitute remedy. Lyon, at 638, f82-83,
". . . the substitution of remedies is effective and reasonable" (J. Howe, J. Russon concurring, J.
Zimmerman concurring in the result). While Justice Zimmerman did not join at all in the Berry
3

analysis in Lyon, Justice Howe correctly pointed out that the right to sue the governmental entity up
to the "cap" on damages, as a substitute for suit against a negligent employee, was upheld against
a similar attack in Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). See also Parks v. U. T.A., 53 P.3d 473;
2002 UT 55, TJ20 (declining to review Lyon).
Clegg is not in the same position as Lyon; he has no substitute remedy, capped or otherwise.
In that way, he is like Day, who had no remedy at all.
4.

There is No Clear Social or Economic Evil to Justify Absolute Immunity.

While this is not the only way to read the 1993 amendments, see infra, if, in fact, the
Legislature intended to immunize emergency "responders" as well as "pursuers", it left no trace in
the legislative history. The Legislative history of the 1993 amendments focused only on the specific
problem in Day, which was emergency pursuit of criminals. The Legislature attempted to respond
to Day, by identifying criminals fleeing the police as a "very, very serious problem", justifying
immunity for high-speed pursuit when following written policies for such pursuits. (Appellee's Brief,
p. 26, 28). However, Clegg was not fleeing the police, and Jensen was responding to an ordinary
automobile accident. There is no legislative history that would justify abrogating Clegg's remedies.
A careful reading of the 1993 amendments reveals that there was a quid pro quo involving highspeed pursuit cases: immunity was granted to pursuers, but only upon following written pursuit
policies. The emergency pursuers got something, and the other drivers on public roads got
something, in the form of the assurance that emergency pursuers would be acting pursuant to a
considered, written policy, providing some balancing of the risks to the public, rather than a "carchase" mentality. There is no similar quid pro quo relating to emergency responders.
4

Wasatch County suggests no "clear social or economic evil" that must be addressed by
allowing emergency responders the freedom to drive in a reckless manner to an ordinary auto
accident scene. Wasatch County does not indicate how granting Jensen immunity "would promote
public safety or defeat essential or core governmental activities and programs that are critical to the
protection of public safety and welfare". Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 620 n. 5 (Utah 2000). As in
Lyon, "Defendants assert no factual or policy justification for the abrogation of remedies against
government employees other than the saving of money". Lyon, at 632, f 56.
Given that the Utah Supreme Court already held complete immunity to violate Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution in Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171; 1999 UT 46, the burden should
be on Wasatch County to somehow justify any change in law that would completely abrogate any
claim by Clegg against an emergency vehicle. Wasatch County offers no rationale why a complete
denial of a remedy in 1993 is consistent with a constitutionally required remedy in 1992. Wasatch
County has utterly failed to carry its burden to justify the abrogation of Clegg's remedies.
B.

Uniform Operation of Laws - Article I, Section 24
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24, also states that "All laws of a general nature

shall have uniform operation". Wasatch County fails to offer any explanation why the 1993 statutory
scheme treats two classes of victims: 1) those injured by emergency vehicles in pursuit, or while
running red lights or stop signs; 2) those injured in any other way by the negligent operation of an
emergency vehicle, in a uniform way. Of course, it does not. There is no uniformity whatsoever.
Wasatch County only cites to the legislative history referencing high-speed pursuits of fleeing

5

criminals, a different part of U.C.A. §41-6-14 entirely.2
Clegg belongs to a class of persons consisting of users of public roads. Jensen belongs to a
class of persons consisting of emergency vehicle operators. The class of emergency vehicle operators
is plausibly divided factually into two classes, pursuers and responders. But there is no apparent
logical or legal reason why the class of emergency vehicle operators should be sub-divided into two
classes, so that immunity should attach to responders but not to pursuers. If anything, a tenuous
argument could be made that pursuers should have immunity, rather than responders. Fleeing
criminals may not be apprehended if not immediately pursued. They may pose a further immediate
threat to the public. The situation is dynamic, requiring a dynamic response. However, the scene of
an auto accident is generally static. The skidmarks and shattered glass are not going to flee
apprehension. While emergency medical attention may be necessary, still, allowing reckless or
negligent driving to reach the scene of an auto accident creates a greater risk of delay due to an
accident caused in response. The Clegg/Jensen collision is a perfect illustration; Jensen's negligent
and reckless driving prevented him from providing assistance at the first auto accident scene, and
necessitated diversion of emergency medical response resources to the Clegg/Jensen collision, rather
than the original accident.
The most plausible distinction between pursuers and responders, for immunity purposes,
actually cuts in the other direction. If anything, there is no reason to take big risks in responding to

2

If the Court finds that Kouris, infra, requires reversal, the constitutionality of U.C.A.
§41-6-14 (1993) need not be considered. Constitutional questions should be avoided. Lyon v.
Burton, 2000 UT 19, If 10; 5 P.3d 616.
6

a static accident scene, while there may be situations where taking risks is justified in pursuing a
criminal. In fact, the statutory requirement for a written pursuit policy appears to recognize and adopt
this very distinction. But, there seems to be no rational justification for completely immunizing
responders.
The literal structure of Section 41-6-14 also subdivides responders into two classes: those
proceeding past a red or stop signal or signal or sign (subsection (b)), and those who speed
(subsection (c)), park, stop or stand (subsection (a)), or otherwise violate the Traffic Code
regulations on direction of movement or turning in specified directions (subsection (d)). Wasatch
County would read this statute as requiring emergency responders to proceed past a red light or stop
sign "only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation", but otherwise allowing
completely unsafe driving by such operators. There is no rationale for this distinction whatsoever.
These two distinct classes are created arbitrarily. They resemble those struck down in Malan
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984)(Guest Statute). The statutory classifications suggested above do
not operate generally or uniformly across the class, i.e., the class of other drivers, such as Clegg, or
the class of emergency vehicle operators, such as Jensen. And they are not based upon differences
that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. Id., at 670. The purpose stated
in the legislative history of balancing the need for apprehension of criminals versus the dangers of
high-speed pursuit is not fiirthered at all by immunizing emergency responders to an auto accident
who drive at reckless speeds, but do not drive through red lights or stop signs.

7

POINT TWO
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE A BLANKET
IMMUNITY TO ANY EMERGENCY RESPONDER WHO ACTIVATES
LIGHTS AND SIREN
It is not clear that the Legislature intended any change in civil tort law when it passed the
1993 amendments to U.C.A. 41-6-14. The prior 1987 version provided a privilege to emergency
vehicle operators to violate certain traffic laws, but made clear that these privileges did not affect
civil tort liability: "the privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with due regard for the safety of all persons
.. .".U.C.A. §41-6-14(3 )(a)( 1987). This makes sense when recalling that the Traffic Code generally
is a criminal code, for criminal responsibility arising out of traffic. See U.C.A. §41-612(1987)(violation of traffic code is a Class C misdemeanor). The Traffic Code only rarely deals
with civil tort liability issues, and when it does, it does so specifically. See e.g. U.C.A. §41-652(2)(1987)(criminal violation of posted prima facie speed limit do not relieve plaintiff in civil
actionfromproving negligence and proximate causation). The immunity for emergency pursuers that
was found unconstitutional in Day was not located in the Traffic Code at all; it was an "add-on" to
the Governmental Immunity Act.
What this means is that the provisions of 41 -6-14 that grant privileges to violate the criminal
provisions of the Traffic Code do not necessarily reflect a decision on the part of the Legislature to
alter the basic rule of tort liability. This reading is suggested by the fact that the 2004 amendment
to 41-6-14 re-inserted the original requirement of the 1987 statute that emergency vehicle operators
"act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator in like circumstances". U.C.A. §41-68

14(5)(2004). If one concludes that the 1993 amendments were not intended to remove the duty to
drive reasonably and prudently, that explains the fact that there is no legislative history whatsoever
discussing it. It explains why there is no apparent legislative history regarding the re-appearance of
the language in 2004.
If the duty of emergency vehicle operators to drive reasonably and prudently existed all along,
the problem posed by Kouris v. U.H.P., 70 P.3d 72,2003 UT 19, is solved. In Kouris, a majority of
this Court could not choke down the proposition that merely activating lights and siren granted a
blanket immunity to drive however negligently or recklessly. The dissent could not choke down the
proposition that 41-6-14 should not be read literally to provide for just that result. But if the 1993
amendments are viewed in a broader historical context, taking due regard to the fact that the Traffic
Code really only deals with criminal violations, not civil liabilities, and in light of the original 1987
requirement of reasonableness and prudence, and the subsequent 2004 re-insertion of subsection (5)
expressly requiring a duty of reasonable care and prudence, Kouris can be read to merely support the
historical rule of tort liability all along. This approach avoids the necessity of addressing the
constitutional issues raised above.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Legislature attempted to raise from the dead, blanket immunity for emergency
response vehicles, like Lazarus of old. The statute that it created in 1993 failed the Article 1, Section
11 test, and the Uniform Operation of Laws test of Section 24. This is made even more apparent by
the 2004 amendments that essentially concede the issue, and bring the statute in line with Day. The
Kouris holding requires reversal as well, adding the benefit of avoiding constitutional issues. The
9

trial court's summary judgment should be reversed.
DATED this 20th Day of October, 2008.
\

Daniel F. Bertch
r»
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ADDENDUM
A.

1987 version of U.C.A. §41-6-14

B.

1993 version of U.C.A. §41-6-14

C.

2004 version of U.C.A. §41-6-14

41-6-14

MOTOR VEHICLES

(d) Any claimant or interested party shall file with the
court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this chapter, any
interested person or claimant of t h e property, prior to
being served with a complaint under this section, may file
a petition in the court having jurisdiction for release of his
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the
claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney
in the county of the seizure, who shall answer the petition
within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint
of forfeiture.
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or
petition for release, the court shall examine the record
and if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the
complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or
release of the property as t h e court determines. If the
county attorney h a s not filed an answer to a petition for
release and the court determines from the evidence t h a t
the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to
answer t h e petition within ten days. If no answer is filed
within t h a t period, the court shall order the release of the
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears
of record at the end of 20 days, the court shall set the
matter for hearing within 20 days. At t h i s hearing, all
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of
release of the property following the state's evidence for
forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance
of the evidence the issues in t h e case and order forfeiture
or release of the property as it determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any
other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this
chapter or t h e laws of this s t a t e .
(i) When the court determines t h a t claimants have no
right in t h e property in whole or in part, it shall declare
the property to be forfeited and direct it to be delivered to
the custody of the Division of Finance. The division shall
dispose of t h e property under Subsection (5).
(j) When the court determines t h a t property, in whole
or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it shall order release
of the property to the proper claimant. If t h e court
determines t h a t t h e property is subject to forfeiture and
release in part, it shall order partial release and partial
forfeiture. When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, the court shall order it sold and
the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate
claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of t h e action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of
filing a n d pursuing the forfeiture, and costs of sale;
and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for t h e General Fund.
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture
is declared, in whole or in part, t h e court shall assess all
costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and
storage of t h e property, against t h e individual or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may
assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to
the property as appropriate.
(7) For purposes of this section, it shall be a rebuttable
presumption t h a t t h e owner of a vehicle was the operator of
the vehicle at the time of t h e offense.
1996

41-6-14.

E m e r g e n c y v e h i c l e s — P o l i c y regarding*!
h i d e pursuits — Applicability of traffic l a *
highway work vehicles — Exemptions.
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, WK
responding to an emergency call or when m the pursuit of d
actual or suspected violator of the law or when responding
but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise S
privileges under this section, subject to Subsections (9ff
through (4).
Jz£
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle m a y i
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions oftH^
chapter;
^
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but *"
only after slowing down as may be necessary for 8 ag/,
operation;
J&
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or
A
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movfe
ment or turning in specified directions.
H:
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator 6W
an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a
vehicle pursuit, apply only when the operator of the vehicle,
sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or usesf:>
visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is"
visible from in front of the vehicle.
(4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of
an authorized emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle"
pursuit apply only when:
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds both an audibler*
signal under Section 41-6-146 and uses a visual signal as*
denned under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in
front of the vehicle;
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the
vehicle has, in effect, a written policy which describes the
manner and circumstances in which any vehicle pursuit
should be conducted and terminated;
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in
accordance with the written policy described in Subsection (4)(b); and
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conformance with standards established by the Department of
Public Safety, Division of Peace Officer Standards and
Training, which shall adopt minimum standards that
shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies
adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit vehicles.
(5) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this
chapter does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other
equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of
a highway. However, the entire chapter applies to those
persons and vehicles when traveling to or from the work.
1993

41-6-15.

P e r s o n s riding or driving a n i m a l s subject to
chapter.
A person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn
vehicle upon a roadway is subject to this chapter, except the
penalties regarding operator licenses specified under the alco198
hol or drug related traffic offenses do not apply.
41-6-16.

Uniform application of c h a p t e r - Effect of
local o r d i n a n c e s .
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and iirdform
throughout this state and in all of its political subdivisions
and municipalities. A local authority may not enact or enforce
any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions 01 tw
chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinance
consistent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinan0®
l
which are not in conflict with this chapter.

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-6-1.5

(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or
without motive power, other t h a n a po\e trarier,
designed for carrying persons or property and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed
so that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the
transportation of property
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing other vehicles and constructed to carry a part of the
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck
tractor
(52) "Urban district" means the territory con
tiguous to and including any street, in which
structures devoted to business, industry, or
dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less
t h a n 100 feet, for a distance of a quarter of a mile
or more
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or
by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks
1987
41-6-1.5.

Private vehicle as emergency vehicle

The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety may make rules, consistent with this chapter,
governing the use, m emergencies, of signal lights on
privately-owned vehicles The rules may include a
rule allowing privately-owned vehicles to be designated for part-time emergency use
1987
41-6-2 to 41-6-10.

Repealed.

1979

ARTICLE 2

EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC
REGULATIONS
41-6-11.

Chapter relates to vehicles on highw a y s — Exceptions.
The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of
vehicles upon highways, except
(1) where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section, or
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13 5
and Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which
apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout
the state
1987
41-6-12. Violations of chapter — Penalties.
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a
class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11,
15, 16, and 17 of this chapter is an infraction, unless
otherwise provided
1991
41-6-13.

Obedience to peace officer or other
traffic controllers.
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any peace
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing
guard invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or
maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use
devices and procedures conforming to the latest edi-

no

tion of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control n
e
vicesfoxStreets and Higrrways "
"
1»87

41-6'13.5.

Failure to respond to officer's sign
to stop — Fleeing — Traveling at exce
sive speeds or causing property da^.
age or bodily injury — Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual o
audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicl
to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or
other means is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) a n ( j
while so doing (a) travels in excess of 30 miles per
hour above the posted speed limit, (b) causes damage
to the property of another or bodily injury to another
or (c) leaves the state, is guilty of a felony of the third
degree
i987
41-6-14.

Emergency vehicles — Applicability of
traffic law to h i g h w a y work vehicles —
Exemptions.
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when m
the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the
law or when responding to but not upon returning
from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges under
this section, subject to Subsection (2)
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions
of this chapter,
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop
sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation,
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger life or property, or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction
of movement or turning in specified directions
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle apply only when t h e vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146,
or u$es a visual signal as defined under Section
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle
(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency
vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the
operator from the consequences of an arbitrary
exercise of the privileges
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13 5, 41-6-44, and
41-6-45, this chapter does not apply to persons,
motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway However, the entire chapter applies to those
persons and vehicles when traveling to or from
the work
1987
41-6-15.

P e r s o n s riding or driving animals subject to chapter.
A person riding an animal or driving any animaldrawn vehicle upon a roadway is subject to this chapter, except the penalties regarding operator licenses
specified under the alcohol or drug related traffic offenses do not apply
1987
41-6-16.

Uniform application of chapter — Effect of local ordinances.
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and
uniform throughout this state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities A local authority
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(n) attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means
(b) A person who violates Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a
felony of the third degree The court shall, as part of any
sentence under this Subsection (1), impose a fine of not
less than $1,000
(2) (a) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so
doing causes death or serious bodily injury to another
person, under circumstances not amounting to murder or
aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second
degree
(b) The court shall, as part of any sentence under this
Subsection (2), impose a fine of not less than $5,000
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other section, a person who violates Subsection (l)(a) or (2)(a) shall have the person's driver license
revoked under Subsection 53-3-220(l)(a)(rx) for a period of
one year
(b) The court shall forward the report of the conviction
to the division If the person is the holder of a driver
license from another jurisdiction, the court shall notify
the division and the division shall notify the appropriate
officials in the licensing state
2003
41-6-13.7.

Vehicle subject to forfeiture — S e i z u r e —
Procedure.
(1) Any conveyance, including vehicles, aircraft, water
craft, or other vessel used m violation of Section 41-6-13 5
shall be subject to forfeiture pursuant to the procedures and
substantive protections established in Title 24, Chapter 1,
Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be
seized by any peace officer of this state upon notice and service
of process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the
property However, seizure without notice and service of
process may be made when
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest under a search
w a r r a n t or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant,
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject
of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal
injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this section, or
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that
the property has been used m violation of the provisions of
Section 41-6-13 5
(3) Property taken or detained under this section is not
repleviable but is m custody of the law enforcement agency
making the seizure, subject only to the orders and decrees of
the court or the official having jurisdiction When property is
seized under this section, the appropriate person or agency
may
(a) place the property under seal,
(b) remove the property to a place designated by the
warrant under which it was seized, or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an
appropriate location for disposition in accordance with
law

41-6-14.
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E m e r g e n c y v e h i c l e s — P o l i c y r e g a r d i n g vehicle p u r s u i t s — Applicability of traffic l a w to
h i g h w a y work v e h i c l e s — E x e m p t i o n s .
(1) Subject to Subsections (2) through (5), the operator of an
authorized emergency vehicle may exercise the privileges
granted under this section when
(a) responding to an emergency call,
(b) in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
the law, or
(c) responding to but not upon returning from a fire
alarm
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may
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(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this
chapter,
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but
only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe
operation,
(c) exceed the maximum bpeed limits, or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of
an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a
vehicle pursuit, apply only when
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal
under Section 41-6-146, or
(b) uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle
(4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of
an authorized emergency vehicle involved m any vehicle
pursuit apply only when
(a) the operator of the vehicle
(I) sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6146, and
(n) uses a visual signal as defined under Section
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle,
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the
vehicle has, in effect, a written policy which describes the
manner and circumstances m which any vehicle pursuit
should be conducted and terminated,
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained m
accordance with the written policy described in Subsection (4)(b), and
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conformance with standards established by the Department of
Public Safety, Division of Peace Officer Standards and
Training, which shall adopt minimum standards that
shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies
adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit vehicles
(5) The privileges granted under this section do not relieve
the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle of the duty to
act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator m like
circumstances
(6) Except for Sections 41-6-13 5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this
chapter does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other
equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of
a highway However, the entire chapter applies to those
persons and vehicles when traveling to or from the work
2004

41-6-15.

P e r s o n s riding or driving a n i m a l s subject to
chapter,
A person ridmg an animal or driving any animal-drawn
vehicle upon a roadway is subject to this chapter, except the
penalties regarding operator licenses specified under the alco
hoi or drug related traffic offenses do not apply
1987
41-6-16.

Uniform application of c h a p t e r — Effect of
local o r d i n a n c e s .
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform
throughout this state and in all of its political subdivisions
and municipalities A local authority may not enact or enforce
any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this
chapter Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances
consistent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances
which are not in conflict with this chapter
1987
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Regulatory p o w e r s of local a u t h o r i t i e s — Traffic-control d e v i c e affecting state h i g h w a y —
N e c e s s i t y of e r e c t i n g traffic-control d e v i c e s .
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local
authorities, with respect to highways under their jurisdiction
and within the reasonable exercise of police power, from

